We consider the security design problem of a lender who can assess the borrower's project prior to making her accept or reject decision. The lender's subjective judgement and beliefs are represented by a private, noncontractible signal. The lender is generally too conservative, i.e., the cutoff signal above which projects are accepted is inefficiently high, which implies there is underinvestment. The unique optimal security is debt. Debt protects the lender as much as possible against financing bad projects, thus implementing a lower cutoff signal than any other security. Our model also provides a rationale for the use of standardized loan terms and quantity rationing in retail lending. While the lender could, in principle, make the loan terms conditional on the signal by choosing from a prespecified menu, such ex-post fine-tuning only worsens her conservative bias. Rather, it is optimal for the lender to commit to either approve the loan at standardized terms or deny credit altogether.
Introduction
Increasingly competitive margins, declining collateral values, and, last but not least, the new BIS II Capital Accord linking capital charges to credit risk exposures underscore the need for better and more sophisticated techniques to measure credit risk. Technological progress notwithstanding, a key factor in the credit decision remains the human decision maker. For example, Saunders and Allen (2002) note: " [T] he credit decision is left to the local or branch lending officer or relationship manager. Implicitly, this person's expertise, subjective judgement, and his weighting of certain key factors are the most important determinants in the decision to grant credit." This paper considers the security design problem of a lender who can assess the borrower's credit risk prior to making the credit decision. In line with the above quote, we assume that the lender's judgement and beliefs are subjective, and thus noncontractible. As a consequence, the lender's accept or reject decision is fully discretionary. It is thus the lender, and only the lender, who ultimately decides whether credit is granted or not. 1,2
The timing is as follows. The lender offers a contract, e.g., bank x advertises that the interest rate for a loan of type y is z per cent. If the borrower accepts, the lender evaluates the project.
To capture the role of subjectivity in the lender's assessment, we assume that the lender observes a private, noncontractible signal about the project's cash-flow distribution. High cash flows are more likely after a high signal, which implies high signals are good news. Based on the signal, the lender either accepts or rejects the borrower.
Given the noncontractibility of the signal, the lender's incentives to accept or reject depend on the value of her claims, and thus on the contract in place. The optimal credit decision follows a simple cutoff rule: Accept all borrowers above some cutoff signal and reject all borrowers below it. We show that the lender is generally too conservative. Unless the lender obtains the full NPV from the project, her cutoff signal lies strictly above the first-best cutoff signal at which the NPV is zero. There consequently exists a range of intermediate signals at which the borrower 1 This is in contrast to, e.g., models in which the borrower has private information. In these models, the lender usually commits to a menu from which the borrower can subsequently choose a contract. 2 Our notion of subjectivity is closely related to Stein's (2002) notion of "soft" information. As an example, Stein gives the (subjective) beliefs of a loan officer as to whether the president of a company is honest and hardworking. Stein examines the implications of subjective judgement in credit decisions for the organizational structure and capital allocation of banks.
is rejected even though the NPV conditional on the signal is positive.
The optimal security minimizes the cutoff signal, and therefore the underinvestment problem.
We show that the unique optimal security is standard debt. Debt maximizes the lender's payoff in low cash-flow states, thus maximizing her return from financing low-signal projects, i.e., projects with a high probability mass on low cash flows. But maximizing the lender's return at low signals is equivalent to minimizing the cutoff signal, which is the signal at which the lender breaks even. Accordingly, debt implements the lowest cutoff signal among all securities, thereby minimizing the lender's conservative bias in credit decisions.
Our results have implications for the policy debate surrounding the separation of banking and commerce in the United States. There, banks are generally forbidden to hold significant equity stakes in nonfinancial firms. Berlin (2000) therefore asks: "Do restrictions against U.S.
banks holding equity make a difference for banks' behavior? Are U.S. banks' borrowers at a disadvantage because their lenders are too cautious when evaluating project risks and too harsh when a borrower experiences financial difficulties?" Our model shows that, while lenders are indeed too cautious, this is not because they hold debt, but because they do not capture the full NPV from the project. In fact, it is debt, and not equity or any other security, that makes lenders the least cautious in their lending.
While the signal is private information, the lender could, in principle, reveal her information by choosing a security from a prespecified menu after observing the signal. We show that the unique optimal menu consists of single security, namely, the optimal debt contract. If the lender offered a menu, she would always pick the security that is ex-post optimal for her. This undermines the lender's ability to promise the borrower as much expected payoff as possible at high signals, which is necessary to tilt the lender's own payoff towards low signals, where the underinvestment constraint binds. Hence offering a menu only raises the cutoff signal and worsens the lender's excessive conservativism.
To put it more succinctly, our model shows that fine-tuning after observing the signal is not optimal. Even though the lender could make the loan terms (indirectly) contingent on the signal by choosing from a menu, it is optimal to offer only a single contract and approve the borrower on the basis of this contract or deny credit altogether. This might help explain the use of quantity rationing in conjunction with standardized loan terms frequently found in retail lending: "[L]oan decisions made for many types of retail loans are reject or accept decisions. All borrowers who are accepted are often charged the same rate of interest and by implication the same risk premium. [...] In the terminology of finance, retail customers are more likely to be sorted or rationed by loan quantity restrictions rather than by price or interest rate differences" (Saunders and Thomas (2001) ).
While loan terms are insensitive with respect to interim information (the signal), our argument differs from theories of intertemporal smoothing in relationship lending. 3 In our model, loan terms do not depend on subjective, or private, information. They do, however, incorporate all publicly available information. By contrast, in the smoothing literature loan terms are insensitive also with respect to public information such as interest rate changes.
This paper provides a new, and intuitive argument for the optimality of debt based on the notion that debt minimizes the conservativism of lenders in credit decisions. Evidently, this argument is different from that in costly state verification models (Townsend (1979) , Gale and Hellwig (1985) ) and repeated lending models with non-verifiable cash flow (Bolton and Scharfstein (1990) , Hart and Moore (1998) , DeMarzo and Fishman (2000) ). Also, unlike Allen and Gale (1988) , risk-sharing considerations play no role here. Innes (1990) considers a moral hazard model in which the borrower (entrepreneur) must be incentivized to work hard. By contrast, in our model the incentive problem is with the lender, and it is a problem of (interim) private information, not moral hazard. Nachman and Noe (1994) , DeMarzo and Duffie (1999) , and Biais and Mariotti (2003) all consider models in which the borrower is privately informed before or after the security design.
By contrast, in our model it is the lender who is privately informed after the security design.
And yet, in both cases the lender optimally receives debt. In both, borrower and lender private information models the optimality of debt derives from the same property, namely, that it maximizes the lender's return from low-type projects. What is different is why this property implies optimality. In the case of borrower private information, it minimizes the sensitivity of the lender's return with respect to the project type, and thus the underpricing of high types (Myers and Majluf (1984) ). By contrast, in the case of lender private information, it maximizes the set of project types (or signals) for which the lender breaks even, thereby minimizing the underinvestment.
Finally, Axelson (2003) , Boot and Thakor (1993) , and Fulghieri and Lukin (2001) also con-3 For an overview, see Berlin and Mester (1998). sider models in which investors face incentive problems. Axelson studies an auction model in which a seller auctions off asset-backed securities to privately informed investors. 4 The optimal security trades off the expected underpricing against the liquidity cost of retaining cash flow.
Boot and Thakor and Fulghieri and Lukin consider costly information production. To make information production attractive, firms issue information-sensitive claims like equity.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 lays out the model. Section 3 presents the main analysis. This section contains three results: (i) underinvestment, (ii) optimality of debt, and (iii) nonoptimality of a menu. Section 4 endogenizes some assumptions made in the base model by embedding the model in an (imperfectly) competitive credit market. Section 5 concludes.
The Model

Project Technology and Credit Risk Analysis
A penniless entrepreneur ("the borrower") has a project which requires a fixed investment k.
The project's cash flow x is stochastic with support X := [x, x], where 0 ≤ x < k, and where x is either finite or infinite. The investment is financed by a lender.
Prior to financing the investment, the lender performs a credit risk analysis. Based on the outcome of the credit risk analysis, the lender forms subjective beliefs about the profitability of the project. 5 These beliefs can be represented by a signal s ∈ S := [0, 1]. Since beliefs are subjective, we assume that the signal is private information. The signal is drawn from the absolutely continuous distribution function F (s), which is common knowledge. We assume that F (0) = 0 and that F (s) has positive density f(s) everywhere in the interior of S. Each signal is associated with a conditional distribution function over cash flows G s (x). 6 We assume that 4 See also Garmaise (2001) , who examines an auction model in which investors have heterogeneous beliefs but no private information. 5 This can be interpreted in two ways. Either the lender brings in specialized expertise, which allows her to interpret given information in a more informative way. For instance, the lender might have gained expertise from holding similar loans in the same industry (Boot and Thakor (2000) ). Or the credit risk analysis utilizes new information, e.g., forecasts by in-house analysts about market growth or product demand that improve the evaluation of the project's risk. In either case, the lender updates her beliefs. 6 The prior (i.e., unconditional) cash-flow distribution is given by the density function
is absolutely continuous with G s (x) = 0 and positive density g s (x) > 0 for all x ∈ X.
Moreover, g s (x) is continuous in s for all x ∈ X. The expected project cash flow conditional upon observing the signal s is µ s := R X xg s (x)dx. 7 Observing a high signal is good news. Precisely, high signals put strictly more probability mass on high cash flows than low signals in the sense of the Monotone Likelihood Ratio Property (MLRP). Assumption 1. For any pair (s, s 0 ) ∈ S with s 0 > s, the ratio g s 0 (x)/g s (x) is strictly increasing in x for all x ∈ X.
MLRP is a common assumption and implies that high cash flows are more likely after high signals than after low signals. MLRP is satisfied by many standard distributions (Milgrom (1981) ). In Appendix A we show that Assumption 1 can be relaxed at the cost of restricting the set of feasible contracts. To rule out the trivial case where the project NPV is either positive or negative for all signals, we assume that µ 0 < k and µ 1 > k.
We can think of at least two inefficiencies associated with credit risk analysis: (i) the lender makes the wrong decision, i.e., she misclassifies bad projects as good ones, and vice versa, and (ii) the lender devotes too little or too much time and effort to the analysis. The second inefficiency has been studied extensively (e.g., Manove, Padilla, and Pagano (2001) , Fulghieri and Lukin (2001) ). To focus on the first inefficiency, we assume that the informativeness of the signal is fixed. While it is straightforward to include a (sufficiently small) fixed cost for the credit risk analysis, we assume for simplicity that the analysis is costless.
Lending Process
The sequence of events is as follows. At τ = 0 the lender publicly offers a menu of contracts T := {t i } i∈I , where I is some index set. A contract t i = t i (x) specifies a repayment out of the project cash flow x. 8 As the signal is private information, contracts cannot directly condition on the signal. The lender could, however, reveal her information through her choice of contract.
Introducing a menu therefore allows the lender, at least in principle, to make the loan terms 7 We assume that µ s is finite for all s.
8 This setting follows Tirole (1990, 1992) . We assume that it is possible to commit to the menu. This assumption can be made explicit by adding a clause stating that if the lender ever signs a contract that is not in the menu, she must pay a large fine.
(indirectly) contingent on the signal. After observing the lender's offer, the borrower decides whether to accept-i.e., apply for a loan under the given conditions-or reject. At τ = 1, the lender performs the credit risk analysis. Based on the resulting signal, the lender either accepts or rejects the borrower. If the lender accepts, she picks a contract from the menu and finances the investment. If she rejects, everybody gets zero. 9 Cash flows are realized at τ = 2.
We make the standard assumption that the repayment be nondecreasing in the project cash flow (e.g., Innes (1990) , DeMarzo and Duffie (1999) ). 10 Assumption 2. The contract t i (x) is nondecreasing.
The literature provides several arguments for why t i (x) might be nondecreasing. One is that-if t i (x) were decreasing over some subset of X-the borrower could make an ex-post arbitrage gain by borrowing cash to boost the project outcome. See Innes (1990) for details. The constraint that t i (x) be nondecreasing is binding at the optimum. Section 3.3 provides a brief discussion of what the optimal contract might look like in the absence of this constraint.
While we assume that the lender makes the contract offer, we want to leave open the possibility that the surplus is shared between the borrower and lender. We do this by assuming that at τ = 0 the borrower must receive V ≥ 0 in expectation. For the most part of the paper, we are agnostic as to why the borrower might be able to capture some surplus. We simply take V as given and solve the model for all feasible V , thus tracing out the entire Pareto frontier. In Section 4, we endogenize V by embedding the model in a competitive credit market.
Finally, we assume that only accepted borrowers can receive a payment from the lender.
In particular, this rules out the possibility of "buying the project from the borrower" before performing the credit risk analysis. If upfront payments were possible, the first best could be attained trivially without any implications for the security design: As the purchase price is sunk, the lender would face first-best incentives in her credit decision. The usual argument for ruling out upfront payments is that they might attract "fly-by-night operators" (Rajan (1992 ), von Thadden (1995 , Hellmann (2002) ). Fly-by-night operators are crooks who have no real 9 At this stage, we could have the borrower choose between accepting or rejecting the lender's contract choice. however, their (potential) presence does not affect the lender's problem, and hence also not the credit decision or security design. 11 The only role of crooks is thus to make upfront payments prohibitively costly. (Any upfront payment would attract all crooks. If there is a potentially large pool of such crooks, the lender's expected profit becomes negative.) Rather than introducing crooks formally, we assume that only accepted borrowers can receive a payment from the lender.
Optimal Credit Decision and Security Design 3.1 The Lender's Problem
Instead of solving the lender's original problem, it is convenient to solve a restricted problem and then show that the solution to this restricted problem uniquely solves the original problem.
The lender's original problem is to choose a menu of contracts T := {t i } i∈I while taking into account the effect of this menu on her subsequent credit decision. The lender's optimal credit decision is to accept the borrower if and only if her payoff at the observed signal is positive for some contract in the menu. 12 If the lender accepts, she picks the contract which yields the highest expected payoff. Let u s (t i ) := R X t i (x)g s (x)dx denote the lender's gross payoff under the contract t i and signal s. If the lender accepts, her gross payoff under the menu T and signal s is then U s (T ) := max t i ∈T u s (t i ), while her net payoff is U s (T ) − k. To simplify the notation, we denote by Ω (T ) ⊆ S the set of all signals at which the borrower is accepted under the menu T . We call Ω (T ) the acceptance set.
The lender's original problem is then as follows. At time τ = 0 the lender chooses T to 1 1 Since the lender does not want to give a loan to a crook, the fact that at τ = 1 both the lender and the crook know the crook's identity is inconsequential.
1 2 We assume that in case of indifference, the lender rejects. Since indifference is a zero-probability event, this assumption is without loss of generality. maximize her ex-ante payoff
where Ω (T ) := { s ∈ S| U s (T ) − k > 0} , subject to the constraint that the borrower receives at least V in expectation,
and the constraint that t i (x) be nondecreasing.
The lender's restricted problem is identical to her original problem, except that the menu T is restricted to a single contract. For expositional convenience, we use the notation t = t(x)
instead of t i (x) whenever we consider the lender's restricted problem. The notation is the same as above, except that now T = {t} . Accordingly, the lender's restricted problem is to choose a contract t = t(x) to maximize
where
and the constraint that t(x) be nondecreasing.
The remainder of this section is organized as follows. Sections 3.2-3.3 solve the lender's restricted problem. We first solve the lender's optimal credit decision at τ = 1 given the contract t in place (Section 3.2). The result is a characterization of the acceptance set Ω (t) .
We also compare the lender's optimal credit decision with the optimal credit decision in a firstbest world where total surplus (rather than the lender's expected payoff) is maximized. In a second step, we consider the lender's contract choice at τ = 0 taking into account the effect on her subsequent credit decision (Section 3.3). The result is a characterization of the optimal contract, or security, t * = t * (x). In Section 3.4 we finally show that the solution to the lender's restricted problem uniquely solves her original problem. Precisely, we show that including any contract in the menu in addition to, or instead of, the optimal contract t * makes the lender strictly worse off. Consequently, the optimal menu of contracts consists of a single contract t * .
Optimal Credit Decision
As a benchmark, we first derive the first-best credit decision. The first-best credit decision is to accept the project if and only if the total surplus µ s − k is positive. Given MLRP (Assumption 1) and continuity of g s (x) in s, the conditional expected cash flow µ s is continuous and strictly increasing in the signal s. Since µ 0 < k and µ 1 > k, the first-best credit decision involves a simple cutoff rule.
Lemma 1. The first-best credit decision is to accept if s > s F B and reject if s ≤ s F B . The cutoff signal s F B is unique, satisfies s F B ∈ (0, 1) , and is given by µ s F B = k.
At the cutoff signal s F B , the expected cash flow conditional on the signal equals the investment cost k. For all s < s F B the expected cash flow is less than k, while for all s > s F B it is greater than k. Hence the first-best credit decision coincides with the NPV rule, which prescribes to accept the project if and only if the NPV is positive. 13 We next consider the optimal credit decision from the lender's perspective. The lender accepts the project if and only if her expected payoff u s (t) − k is positive at the observed signal.
Like the first-best credit decision, the lender's optimal credit decision thus also follows a simple cutoff rule: There exists a unique cutoff signal s * = s * (t) such that acceptance is optimal if and only if s > s * .
Lemma 2. The lender's optimal credit decision is to accept if s > s * and reject if s ≤ s * . If u 1 (t) ≤ k the cutoff signal is s * = 1, while if u 1 (t) > k the cutoff signal is unique, satisfies s * ∈ (0, 1) , and is given by u s * (t) = k.
Proof. If t(x) is a constant, it must be true that t(x) ≤ x < k. But this implies that u s (t) < k for all s ≤ 1, which in turn implies that rejection is optimal for all s. If t(x) is increasing in x over a set of positive measure, Assumptions 1 and 2 together with continuity of g s (x) in s imply that u s (t) is continuous and strictly increasing in s. There are then two cases: If u 1 (t) ≤ k rejection is optimal for all s, while if u 1 (t) > k acceptance is optimal if and only if s > s * ∈ (0, 1) , where
At s = s * the lender just breaks even. If s > s * the lender makes a profit, while if s < s * she makes a loss, which implies she optimally rejects. Hence the acceptance set under the lender's 1 3 If the NPV is exactly zero, we specify that the project be rejected. Since s = s F B is a zero-probability event,
this is without loss of generality.
optimal credit decision is an interval Ω (t) = (s * , 1] . By Lemma 1, the corresponding first-best acceptance set is also an interval, namely
We finally examine whether s * is above or below the first-best cutoff signal s F B . If u 1 (t) ≤ k the lender's optimal cutoff signal is s * = 1, which is evidently above the first-best cutoff signal.
If u 1 (t) > k, on the other hand, the lender's optimal cutoff signal is given by u s * (t) = k. From t(x) ≤ x, we have that
with strict inequality if and only if t(x) < x on a set of positive measure. Accordingly, if t(x) = x the lender breaks even at s = s F B , implying that s * = s F B . On the other hand, if t(x) < x the lender does not break even at s = s F B . Since by Assumptions 1 and 2 and continuity of g s (x)
in s the lender's conditional expected payoff u s (t) − k is strictly increasing in s, her break-even signal must lie strictly above s F B . Hence unless t(x) = x, we have that s * > s F B .
Proposition 1. Unless the lender obtains the full NPV from the project, her credit decision is too conservative, i.e., her optimal cutoff signal s * lies strictly above the first-best cutoff signal
For all signals s ∈ [s F B , s * ) the lender's conditional expected payoff is negative. Implementing the first best would require forcing the lender to finance a project under which she does not break even given her updated beliefs.
The argument that the lender is too conservative is fairly general and does not hinge on Assumptions 1 and 2. In particular, the argument does not hinge on the assumption that t(x) be nondecreasing. This follows immediately from the observation that if t(x) < x on a set of positive measure, we have that u s (t) < µ s for all s ≤ 1. Hence if at some signal s =ŝ it holds that uŝ(t) > k, it must also hold that µŝ > k, but not vice versa. In words: If the lender's optimal credit decision is to accept the project at s =ŝ, the first-best credit decision is also to accept at that signal. The reverse, however, is not true. Hence even without Assumptions 1 and 2 the lender is too conservative in the sense that the acceptance set Ω (t) is strictly smaller than the first-best acceptance set Ω F B . Assumptions 1 and 2 merely ensure that both acceptance sets are connected, i.e., that both the first-best and the lender's credit decision can be characterized by a cutoff rule. 14 "Being too conservative" then has the convenient interpretation that the lender applies too high a cutoff signal.
Optimal Security Design
We now solve the lender's security design problem at τ = 0. Given Lemma 2, the lender's restricted problem simplifies to maximizing
By standard arguments, (2) must bind in equilibrium, which implies the lender receives any surplus in excess of V . There are two cases. If V = 0 the lender obtains the full NPV. The optimal contract is then trivially t(x) = x, and the lender's optimal credit decision is first-best efficient. On the other hand, if V > 0 we have that t(x) < x on a set of positive measure.
By Proposition 1, the credit decision is then inefficient in the sense that the lender is too conservative. As a claimant to the residual surplus, the lender chooses t = t(x) to minimize this inefficiency, i.e., she chooses the contract that implements the lowest feasible cutoff signal s * (t).
Evidently, the same reasoning would apply if the borrower were the residual claimant, i.e., if the borrower made the contract offer subject to leaving the lender a fixed reservation utility. The optimality of our solution is therefore independent of who makes the contract offer.
Clearly, if V is too large the lender cannot break even. In all other cases, a nontrivial contract under which the borrower is accepted with positive probability exists. In the following, we assume that V is sufficiently small in the above sense. We obtain the following result. 15
Proposition 2. The unique optimal security is standard debt. That is, there exists a unique repayment level R > k such that the unique optimal security is t * (x) = x for all x ≤ R and t * (x) = R for all x > R.
If V = 0 the optimal repayment level is R = x and the associated credit decision is firstbest efficient. By contrast, if V > 0 the optimal repayment level satisfies R < x and there is underinvestment relative to the first-best.
assumptions are important for the optimal security design in the following subsection.
1 5 Proposition 2 continues to hold if the investment technology is scalable in the sense that both k and x are multiplied by a constant factor γ ≤ 1. The unique optimal solution to the lender's restricted problem is then to offer a debt contract and finance the full-scale project, i.e., γ = 1.
Proof. The case where V = 0 is obvious. The lender receives the entire surplus, hence the optimal security is trivially t(x) = x for all x (or debt with repayment level R = x). The statement regarding the credit decision follows from Proposition 1.
Consider now the case where V > 0. The underinvestment result follows from Proposition
1.
In what follows, we show that for any (nondecreasing) non-debt contract t = t(x) we can find a debt contractt =t(x) that is strictly preferred by the lender and that satisfies the borrower's participation constraint (2). We constructt as follows: Holding the cutoff signal constant at s * (t), the debt contractt yields the same expected payoff to the lender as the non-debt contract t. Given some non-debt contract t, the debt contractt is therefore uniquely defined by Z 1
where z(x) :=t(x) − t(x). As we are holding the cutoff signal constant, the total surplus also remains constant. Accordingly, since the lender's expected payoff is the same under t andt, the borrower's expected payoff must also be the same under the two contracts.
Given thatt 6 = t and the lender's conditional expected payoff is continuous in s under both t andt, it follows from (3) that there must exist at least one signal s 0 satisfying s * (t) < s 0 < 1 such that R X z(x)g s 0 (x)dx = 0. Moreover, as t is nondecreasing andt is a debt contract, this also implies that there exists a cash flowx ∈ (x, x) such that z(x) ≥ 0 for all x <x and z(x) ≤ 0 for all x >x, where both inequalities are strict over sets of positive measure. As G s (x) satisfies MLRP and s * (t) < s 0 , we have that g s * (t) (x)/g s 0 (x) is strictly decreasing in x. Consequently,
where the last equality follows from the definition of s 0 .
Since
where the equality follows from the definition of s * (t). In words: The lender's conditional expected payoff at s = s * (t) is positive under the debt contractt but zero under the non-debt contract t (by definition of s * (t)). Since R Xt (x)g s (x)dx is strictly increasing in s, this implies that R Xt (x)g s * (t) (x)dx = k for some s * (t) < s * (t), i.e., the cutoff signal implemented byt is strictly lower than that implemented by t.
To wrap up, we have found a debt contractt that, if the acceptance region was fixed at [s * (t), 1], yields both the lender and borrower the same expected payoff as the non-debt contract t. However, undert the borrower is additionally accepted for lower signals s ∈ (s * (t), s * (t)]. The lender is consequently strictly better off undert while the borrower's participation constraint remains satisfied. (In fact, switching from t tot relaxes the borrower's participation constraint as it increases the acceptance probability.) This proves that any optimal contract must be debt.
Having established optimality, uniqueness is straightforward. As the borrower's expected payoff is continuous in R, there exists for each V a compact set of R−values for which (2) binds.
As the lender's expected payoff is increasing in R, the largest value in this set uniquely defines the optimal debt contract t * . Q.E.D.
If V = 0 the optimal contract can be interpreted either as 100 percent equity or as debt with face value R = x. If V > 0 debt is uniquely optimal. Debt implements a lower cutoff signal than any other security, thus maximizing the acceptance set Ω (t) and minimizing the underinvestment proble. The intuition is simple. A debt contract maximizes the lender's payoff in low cash-flow states. Since low cash flows are more likely after a low signal, debt maximizes the lender's expected payoff at low signals. Consequently, under a debt contract the signal at which the lender just breaks even, s * (t), is lower than under any other security.
The proof of Proposition 2 points to an easy-to-make mistake when thinking about possible alternative solution candidates. It is easy to find a contract that, holding the cutoff signal s * constant, yields both the lender and the borrower the same expected payoff as the optimal debt contract. The premature conclusion is that debt is not (uniquely) optimal. What is wrong with this argument is that any such contract must implement a strictly higher cutoff signal than debt. (This is what the proof shows.) Hence the thought exercise of "holding the cutoff signal constant" is illegitimate. A good example is the "solution" of paying an accepted borrower a fixed amount K and receiving 100 per cent of the cash flow in return. It is easy to choose K such that, if the cutoff signal were identical to that under the optimal debt contract, both the lender's and the borrower's expected payoff would be the same as under the optimal debt contract. Does this imply that the proposed scheme is optimal? No, the reason is that it actually implements a higher cutoff signal than debt. The intuition, in this case, is simple. Under a debt contract the borrower's participation constraint is satisfied by giving him cash flow only in good states, thus leaving the lender everything in bad states. This protects the lender as much as possible against bad outcomes, which minimizes her conservative bias. By contrast, under the proposed scheme a constant amount K is given to the borrower in all states. Hence the lender's payoff is x − K for all x, which does not maximize her return in bad states.
Debt is optimal because it allows the lender to commit to the lowest cutoff signal among all securities. The value of this commitment arises from the need to satisfy the borrower's ex-ante participation constraint (2). Holding the contract t constant, the borrower's expected utility is R 1 s * [µ s −u s (t)]f(s)ds, which is decreasing in s * . By committing to a higher acceptance probability 1 − F (s * ), the lender can reduce the borrower's payoff if he is accepted (i.e., she can increase the repayment R) and still provide the borrower with V in expectation. If instead of an ex-ante constraint the lender had to satisfy only an interim participation constraint (e.g., an accepted borrower must receive at least w), there is no commitment problem as the borrower cares only about his payoff if he is accepted. In particular, increasing the likelihood of acceptance then does not allow the lender to reduce the borrower's utility if he is accepted. Hence the optimality of debt (and the nonoptimality of a menu in Section 3.4) derives from a commitment problem, which in turn arises from the need to satisfy the borrower's ex-ante participation constraint. In Section 4 we show that such an ex-ante constraint arises naturally if there is competition in the lending market.
Let us finally comment what the optimal contract might look like in the absence of Assumption 2. Without monotonicity a "live-or-die" (LD) contract t LD (x) with t LD (x) = x if x ≤ e x and t LD (x) = 0 if x > e x, can provide the lender with a higher expected payoff than debt at low signals. On the other hand, it provides the lender with a lower expected payoff at high signals.
If the lender's expected payoff u s (t LD ) − k remains positive at high signals, arguments similar to those in the proof of Proposition 2 can be used to show that LD is uniquely optimal. On the other hand, if u s (t LD ) − k turns negative at high signals, LD-while maximizing the probability of acceptance at low signals-causes rejection at high signals. The optimal nonmonotonic contract then depends on the underlying distributional assumptions.
We conclude with a comparative statics result. As one might expect, the underinvestment problem is more severe the higher is V .
Corollary 1. An increase in V reduces the optimal repayment R and increases the optimal cutoff signal s * .
Proof. From continuity of G s (x) in x, g s (x) in s, and F (s) it follows that the borrower's expected payoff is continuous in R. As a decrease in V relaxes the borrower's participation constraint, optimality implies that the lender offers a higher R. The fact that s * is increasing in R is immediate from the definition of s * and the fact that g s (x) > 0 for all x ∈ X. Q.E.D.
Menu of Contracts
The argument why it is not optimal to offer a menu is closely related to the argument why debt is optimal. If the lender offered a menu, she would always pick the contract that is ex-post optimal for her. But if the lender extracts more surplus at high signals (relative to what she would extract under the single debt contract t * ), she must extract less at low signals if she still wants to provide the borrower with V in expectation. This implies that the critical signal at which the lender breaks even under the menu must be higher than the corresponding signal under the optimal debt contract, i.e., s * (T ) > s * (t * ). Hence by offering only the optimal debt contract t * , the lender commits to maximizing the acceptance probability, which is the most efficient way to satisfy the borrower's ex-ante participation constraint.
Proposition 3. The unique optimal menu consists of a single contract : the unique optimal debt contract t * derived in Proposition 2. Any nondegenerate menu either violates the borrower's participation constraint or implements a cutoff signal that is strictly higher than under t * .
Proof. See Appendix B.
By Proposition 3, the lender optimally offers only a single contract t * that is either accepted or rejected. While the lender could, in principle, fine-tune the loan terms by choosing different contracts for different signals, she optimally limits her choice to either accepting or rejecting the borrower under the prespecified terms. While this implies that loan terms will be insensitive with respect to interim information, it does not imply that they are insensitive with respect to project risk in general. Borrowers with different prior distributions F (s)-and hence different ex-ante expected cash flows R S µ s f(s)ds-will naturally obtain different loan terms. Similarly, the optimal contract t * will vary with respect to investment size and other ex-ante characteristics. Hence our model does not predict that a given lender optimally offers only a single contract. On the contrary, lenders will offer as many contracts as there are differences in ex-ante characteristics.
Our model does, however, predicts that, once borrowers are grouped into different categories, any further discrimination based on interim information (i.e., the signal) will be crude and take the form of an accept or reject decision. This is consistent with the observation that in retail lending accepted borrowers are frequently either granted credit at standardized terms or denied credit altogether. (See the quote by Saunders and Thomas in the Introduction.) It is also consistent with findings by Petersen and Rajan (1994) that the rate charged on smallbusiness loans is typically not sensitive with respect to measures of information generated about a borrower, while the availability of credit is.
Endogenizing V : Credit Market Competition
We have hitherto been agnostic as to where the borrower's reservation utility V might come from. We have simply performed the analysis for all feasible V . In this section, we show that competition in the lending market is one possible reason why the borrower might be able to extract part of the surplus.
While stylized, our model of credit market competition is meant to capture the findings in Petersen and Rajan (1994) that 95 percent of the smallest firms in their sample borrow from a single bank. Across the entire sample (small and large firms), only 18 percent borrow from more than one bank. Moreover, while the distance between banks and their borrowers has increased over the years, Petersen and Rajan (2002) find that the median distance is still only five miles, suggesting that local banks have an advantage over other lenders. Along similar lines, Sharpe (1990) , Rajan (1992), and von Thadden (1995) Our competition model involves a local lender who-due to her familiarity with local conditions or knowledge of the borrower's business-can observe a private signal s in addition to publicly available information. Additionally, there is a competitive credit market without access to the private signal. It is easy to show that the lender would not want to publicly certify her accept/reject decision. Such certification would lead to segmented competition for accepted borrowers at τ = 1 and deprive the lender of any profit. 16 The only way a borrower can prove 1 6 The lender would make no profit because she would reject for all s < 1. Suppose to the contrary that there exists some s * < 1 such that the lender accepts if s > s * . If due to segmented competition at τ = 1 the lender he was accepted is therefore by taking the lender's offer. Conversely, if an accepted borrower does not take the lender's offer, the market does not know whether the borrower was rejected, or whether he was accepted but has declined the lender's offer. Finally, while the market cannot distinguish between accepted and rejected borrowers, we assume it can distinguish between borrowers at τ = 0 or τ = 1. 17
The timing is as follows: Offers are made at τ = 0. While the market cannot distinguish between accepted and rejected borrowers, it can make separate offers for τ = 0 and τ = 1 borrowers. If the market cannot break even, it makes no offer. A borrower then has the following choices: At τ = 0 he can either take the market offer or visit the local lender. If he visits the local lender, the lender performs the credit risk analysis and accepts or rejects the borrower based on the observed signal. At τ = 1 an accepted borrower can choose between the lender's offer and the market offer. By contrast, a rejected borrower's only option is to visit the credit market. We obtain the following result.
Proposition 4. There exists a unique equilibrium. The local lender offers the optimal debt contract t * derived in Proposition 2 and must leave the borrower an expected payoff of V := max {0, µ} ex ante, where
is the NPV based on ex-ante public information. At τ = 0 the borrower visits the local lender.
Regardless of whether the borrower was accepted or rejected, he cannot obtain financing by the market at τ = 1. An accepted borrower therefore optimally stays with the lender.
Proposition 4 endogenizes two assumptions made in Section 2: (i) At τ = 0 the lender must offer the borrower an expected payoff of V to match the competitive market offer, which endogenizes the ex-ante participation constraint (1), and (ii) if the borrower is rejected his payoff is zero, as he is unable to obtain financing elsewhere. Proposition 4 also endogenizes the decision of an accepted borrower. In equilibrium, only rejected borrowers try to obtain financing from must offer each accepted borrower the average NPV across all accepted borrowers,
ds, the lender would not break even at the marginal signal s * , contradicting the definition of s * .
the market. If an accepted borrower deviates and visits the market, the market's rational (onthe-equilibrium-path) belief is that he must be a rejected borrower. Since this implies that he obtains no financing, an accepted borrower optimally stays with the lender.
The borrower's ex-ante outside option V is determined by the project's ex-ante NPV µ. If µ ≤ 0 there is no real competition. If the NPV based on public information is nonpositive, the borrower cannot obtain financing by the market, which implies the lender can extract the entire surplus. By contrast, if µ > 0 there is true competition. Since projects are viable ex ante, the lender must offer the borrower his full ex-ante NPV µ to match the competitive market offer. As borrowers are rejected with positive probability-in which case they obtain no financing-this also implies that an accepted borrower must receive strictly more than µ.
Even if projects are viable ex ante (µ > 0), the lender performs a valuable task by filtering out bad projects. The easiest way to see this is by looking at the lender's and borrower's combined profits. While the borrower obtains his ex-ante NPV µ, the lender earns an additional profit of
Hence the total surplus is greater than µ, which implies additional surplus has been created by the lender's screening activity.
This last argument also provides the intuition for why there cannot exist an equilibrium in which rejected projects are financed by the market. If the project were always financed-either by the lender or by the market-the total surplus is would just equal the ex-ante NPV µ. But this implies that, in a competitive market, the lender cannot extract any profit. Put differently, if the project is always financed, the lender provides no value added. But if the lender provides no value added, her profit in a competitive market must be zero. It is therefore not the lender's screening activity per se that allows her to make a profit, but the fact that her screening leads to the elimination of bad projects. 18
Concluding Remarks
With few exceptions, credit decisions are subjective, and therefore discretionary. 19 Discretion in credit decisions, in turn, implies that the lender's incentives to accept or reject depends on the value of her claims, and thus on the contract in place. We find that the lender is generally too 1 8 Formally, this implies that the cutoff signal s * must be sufficiently low such that the expected NPV of a rejected project,
ds, is negative. The optimal debt contract t * satisfies this requirement.
conservative in the sense that she rejects inefficiently often. The optimal contract minimizes this ex-post inefficiency. The unique optimal contract is debt. Debt maximizies the lender's payoff from financing bad projects, thereby minimizing her conservativism and excessive tendency to reject. The policy implication from this is that the current restrictions on bank equity holdings in the U.S. (Glass-Steagall Act) may not necessarily curtail banks' optimal behavior, since it is debt-and not equity-that maximizes efficiency.
We furthermore show that the fine-tuning of loan terms after interim information may not be optimal. In principle, the lender could offer a menu of contracts from which she picks a contract after obtaining interim information about the project. Since the lender has full discretion, however, she would always pick the contract that is ex-post optimal for her. This ex-post self-dealing undermines the lender's commitment to leave the borrower as much surplus as possible after good news, which is necessary to maximize her own surplus after bad news.
Hence the same feature that makes debt optimal-namely, mazimization of the lender's return in bad states-makes a menu not optimal. Instead, the optimal solution is to offer a single contract and either reject or accept the borrower based on this contract. Our results may help understand why lending relationships are frequently characterized by standardized loan terms in conjunction with rationing rather than adjustment of loan conditions.
What makes the lender special in our model is that she can screen borrowers, thereby separating good projects from bad ones. It is this activity that drives the security design and that makes debt the optimal contract. In other investment relationships, investors may have a different characteristic ability. For instance, in venture capital finance it is frequently argued that what distinguishes a venture capitalist from, e.g., a bank is the venture capitalist's ability to coach and support projects. And yet again, it is the investor's characteristic ability which drives the security design: To provide the venture capitalist with incentives to work hard, he is given equity or equity-linked securities, like convertibles. In practice, such clear-cut distinctions between investors specializing in ex-ante and ex-post activities is often impossible. Banks, for instance, frequently also engage in ex-post monitoring, while venture capitalists typically also perform screening activities. Exploring the tension between ex-ante screening (which favors debt) and ex-post moral hazard (which often favors equity-linked securities) in a unified framework appears to be an interesting question for future research.
Appendix A: Relaxing Assumption 1
In what follows, we show that we can replace Assumption 1 (MLRP of G s (x)) by a weaker assumption at the cost of strengthening Assumption 2. 20
Assumption 1a. The hazard rate g s (x)/[1 − G s (x)] is strictly decreasing in s for all x < x.
Assumption 2a. t(x) and x − t(x) are both nondecreasing.
We now show that Proposition 2 holds under these alternative assumptions. The fact that
Lemmas 1 and 2 as well as Propositions 1 and 3 hold is obvious.
Proposition 2a. If Assumptions 1 and 2 are replaced by Assumptions 1a and 2a, Proposition 2 continues to hold, i.e., standard debt remains the unique optimal security.
Proof. The proof proceeds as in Proposition 2. We argue to a contradiction, i.e., we assume that some nondebt contract t is optimal and construct a debt contractt that is both feasible and does better. By Assumption 2a, t(x) is continuous, nondecreasing, and satisfies t(
for all x, x 0 ∈ X. Moreover, monotonicity implies that it is differentiable almost everywhere.
The derivative, whenever it exists, is denoted by
Denote the repayment level associated with the debt contractt by x <x < x. By the definition oft, the derivative equals one if x <x and zero if x >x. By (6), we furthermore have
For any two signals s 0 > s in S, we then obtain
Next observe that 0 ≤ d(x) ≤ 1 by Assumption 2a. Moreover, from the construction oft it follows that d(x) > 0 on a set of positive measure for x >x, while either d(x) < 1 on a set of 2 0 Assumption 1a is equivalent to requiring that for any pair (s, s 0 ) ∈ S with s 0 > s the ratio
Gs(x)] is strictly increasing in x. Nachman and Noe (1994) refer to this as Conditional Stochastic Dominance.
The usual argument for Assumption 2a in the contracting literature is that if x − t(x) were decreasing for some x, the borrower could make a gain by destroying cash flow ex post.
positive measure for x <x, or t(x) < x. Together with Assumption 1a, we then have
We can now set s = s * (t) to obtain the analogue of (4) We now have two cases. In one case the menu T is not feasible (Case 1 ). In the other case we can lower the cutoff signal by replacing T with the unique optimal debt contract t * . Since the borrower's participation constraint (1) binds under t * (proof of Proposition 2, last paragraph), this implies that the lender is strictly better off (Case 2 ).
Case 1. Suppose t * ∈ T and s * (T ) = s * (t * ). In words: The menu contains the optimal debt contract, and this contract determines the cutoff signal s * (T ). We now show that if t * is not chosen for almost all s > s * , then T must violate the borrower's participation constraint (1).
As t * is not chosen for almost all s > s * , there exists some t 6 = t * in T and someŝ satisfying s * (T ) ≤ŝ < 1 such that uŝ(t) ≥ uŝ(t * ), i.e., t is weakly preferred to t * after observing the signalŝ. But this implies that t must be strictly preferred to t * for all s >ŝ. The argument is analogous to that in the proof of Proposition 2. Define z(x) := t * (x) − t(x). Since t * (x) is a debt contract and t(x) is nondecreasing, there exists somex ∈ (x, x) such that z(x) ≥ 0 for all x <x and z(x) ≤ 0 for all x >x, where the inequalities are strict over sets of positive measure.
By MLRP of G s (x), we then obtain for s >ŝ that Z
which completes the argument. Since u s (t) > u s (t * ) for all s >ŝ, and s * (T ) = s * (t * ), the lender's ex-ante payoff from offering the menu is strictly greater than from offering only t * , i.e., U(T ) > U (t * ) . But since the cutoff signal is the same, i.e., s * (T ) = s * (t * ), the borrower's ex-ante payoff must be strictly less, i.e., V (T ) < V (t * ) . However, by construction of t * (proof of Proposition 2, last paragraph), we have that V (t * ) = V , implying that V (T ) < V . In words: The lender cannot have the best of both worlds. If she offers t * to implement the (lowest possible) cutoff signal s * (t * ), she cannot additionally choose other contracts at higher signals, or else the borrower will not receive V in expectation.
Case 2. Suppose s * (T ) 6 = s * (t * ), which covers all cases not covered in Case 1. In this case, we can straightforwardly apply the logic in the proof of Proposition 2 and show that replacing T with a single contract t * makes the lender strictly better off. Consider the "cutoff contract" t ∈ T defined by s * (T ) = s * (t). (If there are several such contracts in the menu, take one of them.) Next, delete all contracts t 6 =t from the menu. By construction, the cutoff signal s * (t)
remains unchanged. Moreover, since the lender (weakly) prefers the deleted contracts overt for some s ≥ s * (t), but the cutoff signal remains unchanged, the borrower is not made worse off. That is, his participation constraint (1) is still satisfied after the deletion. We can then use the argument in the proof of Proposition 2 and replace the single remaining contractt with the optimal debt contract t * . This lowers the cutoff signal, while the borrower's participation constraint binds under t * . Consequently, the lender is strictly better off if T is replaced with t * .
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 4. To simplify matters, we use the term "positive offer" to denote an offer by the market at τ = 1 under which attracted borrowers receive a positive payoff.
The case where µ ≤ 0 is straightforward. Since any positive market offer which attracts accepted borrowers also attracts all rejected borrowers, the expected NPV of financing a borrower visiting the market at τ = 1 can be at most µ. 21 Given that the market must break even, it therefore cannot make a positive offer. The same is true for τ = 0. Accepted borrowers thus optimally stay with the lender, and we are back to the model setup in Section 2 with V = 0.
At τ = 0 the lender optimally offers t * (x) = x, which leaves the borrower an expected payoff of zero.
In the remainder of the proof, we consider the case where µ > 0. To simplify the exposition, 2 1 Since µ ≤ 0 rejected borrowers must have a negative expected NPV. This implies that there cannot exist a market offer that is separating and generates zero profit, since rejected borrowers would inevitably be attracted by the offer.
we make use of an observation in the proof of Proposition 3 that for any menu T the optimal credit decision follows a simple cutoff rule. The acceptance set Ω(T ) is then some interval [s * , 1] , where s * = s * (T ). The proof for µ > 0 proceeds in several steps. We first prove an auxiliary result stating that if the market can make a positive offer (under which it breaks even) at τ = 1, then the lender's expected payoff at τ = 0 cannot be positive (Step 1 ). We subsequently show that the constellation described in the proposition is an equilibrium (Steps 2a-c) . We finally show that the equilibrium is unique (Step 3 ).
Step 1. Suppose at τ = 1 an accepted borrower stays with the lender's with probability 1−ξ, while with probability ξ ∈ [0, 1] he takes the market offer. Evidently, a rejected borrower always takes a positive market offer. Accordingly, the expected NPV of financing a borrower visiting the market at τ = 1 isV
1−F (s * ) ds is the expected NPV of an accepted borrower, while
F (s * ) ds is the expected NPV of a rejected borrower. Given that the market makes zero profit,V is also what borrowers visiting the market at τ = 1 will get on average.
Since µ > 0 projects are viable on an ex-ante basis. Consequently, at τ = 0 the lender must offer the borrower an expected payoff of at least µ > 0. Given the borrower's decision at τ = 1, his ex-ante participation constraint is
Inserting (8) in (9), the latter transforms to
which implies that, regardless of ξ, the lender's expected payoff at τ = 0 is nonpositive. (If (9) binds, the lender's expected payoff is zero.) Intuitively, if the market makes a positive offer at τ = 1, the project gets always financed-either by the lender or by the market. But this implies that the total surplus just equals the ex-ante NPV µ. Since µ is also what the lender must leave the borrower to satisfy his participation constraint, the lender makes no profit. Put differently, if the project gets always financed, the lender provides no value added. But if the lender provides no value added, her profit in a competitive credit market must be zero.
Step 2a. We next show that if the market does not make a positive offer at τ = 1, the lender's maximization program coincides with that in Section 3.1, which implies that the unique optimal offer is t * . ( To prove that the constellation described in the proposition is an equilibrium, we must also
show that the converse is true, i.e., if the lender offers t * , the market cannot make a positive offer at τ = 1. Specifically, we will show that (i) even under the "most optimistic beliefs" the market cannot make an offer which attracts accepted borrowers (Step 2b), and (ii) rejected borrowers have a negative NPV (Step 2c). Together, Steps 2b-c imply that if the lender offers t * , the market cannot make a positive offer at τ = 1.
Step 2b. Since any market offer attracting accepted borrowers also attracts all rejected borrowers, the "most optimistic beliefs" are those where-besides all rejected borrowers-all accepted borrowers visit the market at τ = 1. By definition, these are the prior beliefs F (s).
Given these beliefs, the expected NPV of a borrower visiting the market at τ = 1 is µ. Let t m denote the contract offered by the market. 22 For the market to break even, t m must satisfy
i.e., borrowers visiting the market at τ = 1 must receive on average µ. Consider next the optimal debt contract t * . By construction (see Section 3.1), t * satisfies Z 1
Since R s * 0 [µ s − u s (t m )] f(s)ds > 0, (10) and (11) together (after dividing through by 1 − F (s * ))
2 2 Below we show that if the lender offers t * , rejected borrowers have a negative NPV. Again, this then implies that there cannot exist a market offer that is separating and generates zero profit.
imply that
The left-hand side is the expected payoff of an accepted borrower unter t * , while the right-hand side is the expected payoff of an accepted borrower under t m . 23 Hence an accepted borrower prefers t * over t m even though t m is the highest possible market offer, i.e., the offer under which the market breaks even only if-in addition to attracting rejected borrowers-it also attracts all accepted borrowers.
Step 2c. 
i.e., the expected NPV of financing a rejected borrower is negative. 24 In a certain sense, Step 2c is the mirror image of Step 1. Starting out from the fact that the lender makes a positive profit, it shows that a rejected borrower cannot obtain financing by the market.
Step 1 shows the converse, i.e., if a (rejected) borrower can obtain financing by the market, the lender cannot make a positive profit.
Step 3. It remains to establish uniqueness. Evidently, there cannot exist an equilibrium in which the lender offers T 6 = t * and the market makes a positive offer at τ = 1. As was shown in
Step 1, the lender would then make zero profit, whereby by offering t * she makes a positive profit (Steps 2b-c.) There also cannot exist an equilibrium in which the lender offers T 6 = t * and the market does not make a positive offer at τ = 1. As was shown in Step 2a, if the market does not make a positive offer at τ = 1, the unique optimal offer is t * . Q.E.D.
2 3 Since an accepted borrower knows he was accepted, his beliefs regarding his own type (signal) have the density f (s)/[1 − F (s * )] for s > s * and zero otherwise.
2 4 If the lender offers t * , the market knows from Step 2b that a borrower visiting the market must have been rejected. The expression in (13) is the NPV of financing a borrower conditional on knowing that he was rejected.
